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Abstract—We consider the problem of characterizing network
capacity in the presence of adversarial errors on network links,
focusing in particular on the effect of low-capacity feedback links
across network cuts. In [1], the authors gave cut-set bound for un-
equal links capacity network and achievable strategy for coding,
decoding and detection ,which only cover the network with large
enough feedback across the network, allowing intermediate nodes
reliably transporting part of code by some proper code back to
supper source. However when feedback has small capacity, the
strategy will be failed , the intuition is that you cannot have a
simple code on low capacity feedback. We analysis thoroughly the
behavior of adversary on small capacity of feedback link, which
turns out that it’s more complex than large-capacity feedback,
and give corresponding strategies. We give a new outer bound as
well as a new achievable strategy, and show a family of networks
where the inner and outer bounds coincide.
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of reliable network communication in the pres-
ence of adversarial link errors was first considered by Yeung
and Cai [2], [3] for the case of networks with equal capacity
links. They generalized the Hamming bound, the Singleton
bound, and the Gilbert-Varshamov bound from classical error
correction coding to network coding. In this problem, an
adversary can arbitrarily corrupt information on a set of z
network links whose locations are unknown to the network
user. Yeung and Cai [2], [3] showed that the multicast capacity
is given by m − 2z, where m is the minimum source-sink
cut capacity, and that the capacity can be achieved by linear
network coding.
However in previous work, the authors assume unit link
capacity. In the error-free case, any link l with capacity r
can be represented by r edges of capacity one without loss
of generality, but in the case with errors, there is a loss of
generality in assuming that errors occur independently on the
unit capacity edges.
In recent work [1], [4], [5], the authors considered the
case of networks with unequal link capacities. They showed
that, unlike the case of equal link capacities, feedback across
network cuts can increase the error correction capacity. They
provided upper bounds on capacity, and coding strategies that
achieve the upper bounds in a family of zig-zag networks with
feedback links of sufficient capacity. The related problem of
network error correction with adversarial nodes was consid-
ered by [6], [7].
In this paper, we consider zig-zag network with small-
capacity feedback links, which we have discussed in [8]
under specific condition of feedback link, and also for which
previous bounds in [1] are not tight. We provide a new upper
bound and a new coding strategy that achieves the upper bound
in a family of zig-zag networks with small feedback capacity.
II. PRELIMINARY
We consider a communication network represented by a
directed acyclic graph G = (V, E). Source node s ∈ V
transmits information to the sink nodes u ∈ V . Let r(a, b)
denote the capacity of edge (a, b) ∈ E . We assume that code
alphabet A is GF (q) for some large enough q. We can view
an error vector on a link l ∈ E as set of r(l) symbols in A,
where the output yl of link l equals the mod q sum of the
input xl to link l and the error el applied to link l. We say
that there are τ error links in the network if el 6= 0 on τ links.
Definition 1. A network code is z-error link-correcting if it
can correct any τ adversarial links for τ ≤ z. That is, if the
total number of adversarial links in the network is at most
z, then the source message can be recovered by all the sink
nodes u ∈ U .
Let (A,B) be a partition of V , and define the cut for the
partition (A,B) by
cut(A,B) = {(a, b) ∈ E : a ∈ A, b ∈ B}.
cut(A,B) is called a cut between two nodes a and b if a ∈ A
and b ∈ B. The links in cut(A,B) are called the forward links
of the cut. The links (a, b) for which a ∈ B, b ∈ A are called
the feedback links of the cut(A,B). The capacity of a cut is
the sum of the capacities of the forward links of the cut.
For any cut Q = cut(P,V\P ), let QR denote the set of
feedback links across cut Q. We say that a feedback link l ∈
QR is directly downstream of a forward link l′ ∈ Q (and that
l′ is directly upstream of l) if there is a directed path starting
from l′ and ending with l that does not include other links in
Q or QR.
III. NEW UPPER BOUND
We introduce a new upper bounding approach which con-
siders confusion between two possible sets of z forward
adversarial links, when there exist two codewords that differ
in these forward links but coincide in the values of their
directly downstream feedback links and the remaining forward
links. The bound is then the sum of the capacities of these
feedback links plus the capacities of the remaining forward
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links. Therefore, this bound is useful when the feedback link
capacities are sufficiently small.
To state this result formally, consider any cut Q =
cut(P,V\P ), and two disjoint sets of forward links Z1, Z2 ⊂
Q where |Zi| ≤ z for i = 1, 2. Let W1 be the set of links
in QR which are directly downstream of a link in Z1 and
upstream of a link in Q\Z1. Let W2 be the set of links in QR
which are directly downstream of a link in Z2 and upstream
of a link in Q\Z2.
Theorem 1. Let
M =
∑
(a,b)∈((Q\Z1)\Z2)∪W1∪W2
r(a, b)
denote the sum of capacities of forward links in (Q\ Z1)\Z2
and feedback links in W1 and W2. If no link in Z2 is directly
upstream of any link in W1, and no link in Z1 is directly
upstream of any link in W2, then the capacity is at most M .
Proof: We assume that the codebook X contains more
than qM codewords, and show that this leads to a contradic-
tion. Let k denote the number of links on the cut Q, and let
m = |Z1|, n = |Z2|.
Since |X| > qM , from the definition of M , there exist two
distinct codewords x, x′ ∈ X such that the error-free outputs
on the links in (Q\Z1)\Z2 and W1 ∪W2 are the same. The
corresponding observations on the sink side of the cut are
O(x) = {y1, .., yk−m−n, u1, .., um, w1, .., wn}
O(x′) = {y1, .., yk−m−n, u′1, .., u′m, w′1, .., w′n},
where (y1, .., yk−m−n) denote the error-free outputs on the
links in (Q\Z1)\Z2 for x and x′; (u1, .., um) and (u′1, .., u′m)
denote the error-free outputs on the links in Z1 for x and
x′ respectively; and (w1, .., wn) and (w′1, .., w
′
n) denote the
error-free outputs on the links in Z2 for x and x′ respectively.
Since no link in Z2 is directly upstream of any link in W1,
the values on W1 are determined by the values on Q\Z2.
Similarly, since no link in Z1 is directly upstream of any link
in W2, the values on W2 are determined by Q\Z1.
We will show that it is possible for the adversary to produce
exactly the same outputs on all the channels in Q under x and
x′ when errors occur on at most z links.
Assume the input of network is x. The adversary could
choose forward links set Z1 as its z adversarial links, and apply
errors on Z1 to change the output from ui to u′i ∀1 ≤ i ≤ m.
Note that the values on W1 are determined by the values on
Q\Z2, which, under these errors, are same as for x′, and that
the values on W1 are the same for x and x′. Therefore, the
values on W1 are not changed, and thus the values on Q\Z1
are not affected. The observations on the sink side of the cut
are {y1, .., yk−m−n, u′1, .., u′m, w1, .., wn}.
When codeword x′ is transmitted, the adversary could
choose forward links set Z2 as its z adversarial links, and
apply errors on them to change (w′1, .., w
′
n) to (w1, .., wn).
Similarly, since the values on W2 are determined by the values
on Q\Z1, which, under these errors, are the same as for x, and
since the values on W1 are the same for x and x′, the values
on W2 and on Q\Z2 are not affected. The observations on the
sink side of the cut are {y1, .., yk−m−n, u′1, .., u′m, w1, .., wn},
the same output as before.
A number of variations of this result are possible. For
instance, if there are no links in QR which are directly
downstream of a link in Z2 and upstream of a link in Q\Z2
(i.e. W2 is empty), we can redefine W1 to be the set of links
in QR which are directly downstream of a link in Z1 and
upstream of a link in (Q\Z1)\Z2, which is smaller compared
to the previous definition.
For the example network in Fig. 1, with two adversarial
links, our previous result in [1] gives a bound of 8, whereas
Theorem 1 gives a bound of 5+b, which is tighter when b < 3.
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Fig. 1. Four node acyclic networks:Given the cut Q = cut({s,B}, {A, t}),
unbounded reliable communication is allowed from source s to its neighbor
B on one side of the cut and from node A to sink u on the other side of cut,
respectively. There is a feedback link from A to B with capacity b
IV. PRELIMINARY FOR ACHIEVE STRATEGY
s
A B
u
b
∞
c
c
c
a
a
a
∞
· · ·
· · ·
Fig. 2. Four nodes acyclic network: n forward links from node s to
intermediate node A, m links between node B and sink u , and two
unbounded links.
We define a family of zig-zag acyclic network model first.
Denote Fig. 2 by G, let s is the source node and u is the sink,
node A and B are two intermediate nodes. let r(·) represent the
capacity of link, given r(s,A) = a, r(B, u) = c, r(A,B) = b
and a > c, a > b. Also unbounded reliable communication is
allowed from source s to B and from node A to sink u. Let
n be the number of links from source node to node A and m
2
be the number of links from node B to the sink. We will call
upstream for links between source and node A, downstream
for links between intermediate node B and sink.
By Theorem 1, we focus on the family of zig-zag network,
the upper bound of which is
UB = (n− z)a+ (m− z)c+ b
According to [1], the tight bound of zig-zag network is
strongly related with topology of network, in order to provide
a proper coding strategy, we have to first discuss properties of
topology of network.
To find these conditions, we compare UB with cut set bound
considered in [1]. Strictly, there are three variations of cut set
bound according to topology of network in [1]. We describe
these possible bounds briefly as following:
1) SB1: Adversary attacks z1 downstream links and no
more than 2z − z1 other downstream links on two
codewords respectively, which they implicate each other.
2) SB2: Adversary erases feedback link and we bound the
remaining network by Singleton bound .
3) SB3: Adversary attacks feedback link and z1 upstream
links implicating z2 attack on downstream, and attacks
z2 on downstream links implicating z1 attack on down-
stream and feedback, z1 + z2 ≤ 2z − 1.
4) SB4(UB): Adversary attacks z1 upstream links and z2
downstream links to implicate each other with the same
output on feedback link, z1 + z2 ≤ 2z.
We categorize zig-zag network into four categories by
observation of number of upstream and downstream,
Category 1. n ≥ 2(z − 1),m ≥ 2z
According to above describe about SB1 and SB2, we give
SB1 = na+ (m− 2z)c
SB2 = (n− 2(z − 1))a+mc
Suppose UB is tighter than SB1 and SB2, then
0 < SB1− UB
0 < na+ (m− 2z)c− ((n− z)a+ (m− z)c+ b)
b < z(a− c)
and
0 < SB2− UB
0 < (n− 2(z − 1))a+mc− ((n− z)a+ (m− z)c+ b)
b < zc− (z − 2)a
Thus we have,
b < min{z(a− c), zc− (z − 2)a} (1)
and new bound is tightest in network G under (1).
Category 2. z ≤ n < 2(z − 1),m ≥ 2z
We have
SB1 = na+ (m− 2z)c
SB2 = (m− (2(z − 1)− n))c
Since UB < SB1, UB < SB2, it’s not hard to have
b < min{z(a− c), (n− z + 2)c− (n− z)a} (2)
Clearly, (1) and (2) exactly define a family of networks in
which new bound we proposed is tight.
For SB3, it is a trivial case that UB < SB, since
SB3 = (n− (z − 1))a+ (m− z)c
= (n− z)a+ (m− z)c+ a
where b < a by definition of four-node network.
Category 3. n ≥ 2(z − 1),m < 2z
According to above describe on possible bounds, we have
SB1 = (n− (2z −m))a
SB2 = (n− 2(z − 1))a+mc
= (n− z)a+ (m− z)c+ zc− (z − 2)a
SB3 = (n− (z − 1))a+ (m− z)c
= (n− z)a+ (m− z)c+ a
Suppose UB is tighter than above bounds, compare it with
SB1, SB2, SB3, not hard to have the following inequalities,
b < zc− (z − 2)a
b < (m− z)(a− c)
b < a
which follows UB < SB1, UB < SB2, UB < SB3
respectively, thus we have
b < min{zc− (z − 2)a, (m− z)(a− c)} (3)
Category 4. : z ≤ n < 2(z − 1),m < 2z
Similarly, we have SB1, SB2, SB3,
SB1 = (n− (2z −m))a
= (n− z)a+ (m− z)c+ (m− z)(a− c)
SB2 = (m− (2(z − 1)− n))c
= (n− z)a+ (m− z)c+ (n− z + 2)c− (n− z)a
SB3 = (n− (z − 1))a+ (m− z)c
= (n− z)a+ (m− z)c+ a
Suppose UB is tighter than the other bounds, we have the
tight condition,
b < (n− z + 2)c− (n− z)a
b < (m− z)(a− c)
b < a
which gives
b < min{(n− z + 2)c− (n− z)a, (m− z)(a− c)} (4)
Note that in this paper, we will call (1 − 4) as tight
conditions, We formalize the upper bound to be
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V. ENCODE
Let {X ,Y} be message set and k1 = n− z, k2 = d ba−ce,
X = {xi,j |1 ≤ i ≤ a− c, 1 ≤ j ≤ (n− z) + k2}
Y = {yi,j |1 ≤ i ≤ c, 1 ≤ j ≤ m+ n− 2z}
Notice that for X , we define only when ba−c is integer,
equality holds for j, otherwise 1 ≤ j < (n−z)+k2 such that
|X | = UB − |Y|.
Each message symbol is i.i.d over GF (q) and q is a prime
power. Let X be (a−c)×n matrix, ith row of which is defined
as
(ri,1, ri,2, . . . , ri,n) = (xi,1, xi,2, . . . , xi,k1+k′i,2)G
where xi,j ∈ X and
∑a−c
i=1 k
′
i,2 = b, 0 ≤ k′i,2 ≤ k2
G = (I(k1+k′i,2)×(k1+k′i,2) E) (5)
where G is generator matrix for a (n, n−k1−k′i,2) systematic
MDS code, we denote entries of E by ηi,j , i = 1, . . . , k1 +
k′i,2, j = 1, . . . , n− k1 − k′i,2, which are chosen uniformly at
random from nonzero entries of a large finite field.
Not hard to check that we can choose k′i,2 ∈ [0, k2] for
each row of X properly to encode |X | = UB − |Y| message
symbols.
Define Y is a c× (n+m− 2z) matrix, the (i, j)th entry of
matrix Y is given by yi,j ∈ Y, 1 ≤ i ≤ c, 1 ≤ j ≤ n+m−2z,
and define L is a c × 2z matrix, the (i, j)th entry of matrix
L is denoted by li,j , 1 ≤ i ≤ c, 1 ≤ j ≤ 2z, which is linear
combination of all the message symbols {X ,Y}, in that any
subset of symbols is maximally independent. Note that there
is large enough q such that any subset of symbols in Y are
maximally independent over GF (q).
On network G, we define codeword for given message
sequence (X ,Y) as follows,
C =
(
X 0
Y L
)
where 0 is zero matrix, the dimension of which is (a−c)×m.
Then the dimension of C is a× (m+ n). Source S and node
B cooperate to send codeword C. Source S sends the first
columns i = 1, . . . , n of C to A and node B sends the columns
i = n+ 1, . . . , n+m to sink.
If no errors have previously been detected, the signal sent
by node A on the feedback link is defined as follows. Consider
arbitrary row of X , we rewrite the row vector as following for
easily analysis, and we ignore the index of row for simplicity.
(r1 . . . rk1 , rk1+1 . . . rk1+k′2 , rk1+k′2+1 . . . rn)
= (x1 . . . xk1 , v1 . . . vk′2 , r1 . . . rk3) (6)
where k3 = n − k1 − k′2 and let x = {xi = ri, i =
1, . . . , k1},v = {vi = rk1+i, i = 1, . . . , k′2}, r = {ri, i =
1, . . . , n− k1− k′2} where from (5), rj =
∑k1+k′2
i=1 ηi,jxi, j =
1, . . . , n− k1 − k′2 and k′2 represents k′i,2, ηi,j represents the
(i, j) elements of E.
Now consider a received row vector of Xˆ at node A,
(xˆ1 . . . xˆk1 , vˆk1+1 . . . vˆk1+k′2 , rˆ1 . . . rˆk3). (7)
where from (Node A) sends the feedback symbols
{δi = vˆi − (η1,ixˆ1 + . . .+ ηk1,ixˆk1)|i = 1, . . . , k′2} (8)
corresponding to each row of Xˆ .
Then we define claim message on node B which will be
used when new erroneous is detected on upstream. Let claim
message W be (a − c) × m matrix such that (X,W ) is an
(n+m,n+m− k1 − k2) MDS code.
VI. ENCODING ERROR SIGNALING
We will describe strategy to show how intermediate node
A and B cooperate to detect adversary on upstream in this
section.
Strategy will show that either intermediate node A or
B could find out when erroneous is injected first time on
upstream, and Lemma 1 in following shows that if sink
has identified two adversary links successfully on upstream,
sink can decode without feedback and any extra information
from intermediate nodes, thus we will focus on the following
scenario of adversary behavior,
1) Adversary only attacks forward link in first attack.
2) Adversary attacks the other forward links to hide the
changing of attack behavior in subsequent attack.
Lemma 1. Given two adversary links from source S to node
A are identified, the sink can decode correctly with remaining
codeword without information from feedback link.
Proof: Suppose the number of upstream links identified
by sink is x, denote Singleton bound on remaining network
by SB.
Category 1. n > 2(z − 1)
Singleton bound, SB, on the remaining network is
SB = (n− x− 2(z − x))a+mc (9)
= (n+ x− 2z)a+mc
Then define
f(x) = SB − UB
= (n+ x− 2z)a+mc− ((n− z)a+ (m− z)c+ b)
= ax− z(a− c)− b
Observe zero point of f(x), we have
x =
z(a− c) + b
a
<
z(a− c) + zc− (z − 2)a
a
(10)
= 2
where (10) follows (1), (3) .
Then f(x) is a strictly monotonous increase function for
given network.
Category 2. z ≤ n ≤ 2(z − 1)
4
Consider the SB on remaining network,
SB =
{
(n+ x− 2z)a+mc x > 2z − n
(n+m+ x− 2z)c x ≤ 2z − n
Then we have f(x) denoted as
f(x) = SB − UB
=
{
ax− z(a− c)− b x > 2z − n
xc− (n− z)(a− c)− b x ≤ 2z − n
Consider zero point of f(x) when x ≤ 2z − n,
0 = f(x) (11)
0 = xc− (n− z)(a− c)− b
x =
(n− z)(a− c) + b
c
<
(n− z)(a− c) + (n− z + 2)c− (n− z)a
c
(12)
= 2
(12) follows (2), (4). Clearly, f(x) is a strictly monotonous
increase function when x ≤ 2z − n. Then we observe f(x)
for x > 2z − n,
f(x) = ax− z(a− c)− b
> ax− z(a− c)− ((n− z + 2)c− (n− z)a)(13)
> ax− z(a− c)− (zc− (n− z)a) (14)
= (x− 2z + n)a
> 0 (15)
where (13) follows (2), (4), (14) follows n ≤ 2(z − 1) and
(15) follows x > 2z − n.
Then f(x) is a a strictly monotonous increase function and
it has an unique zero point x = 2. Thus we have f(x) = SB−
UB > 0 when x = 2, which indicates that Singleton bound
on the remaining network is greater than UB on the original
network after the sink identifies 2 adversary links between
source node and node A.
A. Preliminary for error signaling
For each codeword C, intermediate node A receives Xˆ and
Yˆ . Node A checks each row of Xˆ , then according to results
of observation, it will send side information to node B, which
lets node B have some knowledge of upstream.
Before error signaling description, we give some prelim-
inary first and we assume that feedback link is clean in
section VI. Consider a row vector of Xˆ at node A by ignoring
index of row,
(xˆ1 . . . xˆk1 , vˆ1 . . . vˆk′2 , rˆ1 . . . rˆk3)
We define ∆ for each received row vector,
∆ = {δj = rˆj −
k1∑
i=1
ηi,j xˆi −
k1+k
′
2∑
i=k1+1
ηi,j vˆi)} (16)
where j = 1, . . . , k3.
The intuition of detection is that intermediate node A and
B choose proper strategy by observing (16) or variation of
(16) to detect new happened adversary links.
Define claim-sending signal from node A, calling it CS for
short, once node B receives CS, it will sends W to sink, it
will let sink have (Xˆ, Wˆ ), which is an MDS code against at
most z error links.
B. Error Signal Encoding Analysis
In this subsection, we will discuss several cases to show
that there is always a proper strategy for intermediate node A
and B such that:
• Once adversary conduct the first attack on X , either node
A or node B has ability to find it.
• Adversary cannot hide the new error links by corrupt
multi-links given there was only one link attacked in
previous transmission.
We simply describe feedback operation for error signal first.
For each received row of Xˆ , node A observes ∆, since δi ∈ ∆
is derived from redundant symbol on corresponding row of
Xˆ , it can reflect whether (x, r) is attacked, then based on
observation of ∆, node A will send different error signal
messages through feedback.
Also the signals on feedback could be different even for the
same observation of ∆ since the same observations of ∆ from
different transmission could be caused by different adversary
behaviors. Thus error signal on feedback that node A sends is
formulated by considering the observation of previous ∆ too.
And we define a general operation function on feedback,
F = {f˜ = H(δi, i = 1, . . . , k2)}, (17)
where H(·) is a linear function determined by the observation
of ∆.
We organize error signaling analysis according to size of ∆
since different size of ∆ indicates different detection ability
on node A, and the strategy used by node A to cooperate with
node B have to be different.
Recall definition of ∆, the size of ∆ on each row of X is
determined by k′2. Since k2 = d ba−ce and b < z(a − c), we
have k2 ≤ z, which says 0 ≤ k′2 ≤ z. Given an X , different
rows can has different size of ∆, which are
1) |∆| = z with k′2 = 0,
2) 2 ≤ |∆| < z with 0 < k′2 ≤ z − 2,
3) |∆| = 0 with k′2 = z.
4) |∆| = 1 with k′2 = z − 1,
We will discuss them in four cases, in each of which we
focus on node A and node B cooperates when erroneous
happened first time and node A and node B’s behavior when
new attack happens in subsequent transmission.
Case-1: |∆| = z, k′2 = 0
By the condition, the row has structure as
(x1, . . . , xk1 , r1, . . . , rz) (18)
where xi ∈ X , i = 1, .., k1 and rj =
∑k1
i=1 ηi,jxi, j =
1, . . . , z.
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Given a received (18), we have
∆ = {δj = rˆj −
k1∑
i=1
ηi,j xˆi|j = 1, . . . , z}
and rˆj =
∑k1
i=1 ηi,jxi +4rj where xi is clean symbol and
4rj is injected error symbol, let 4xi = xi − xˆi, we have
∆ = {δj =
k1∑
i=1
ηi,j4xi +4rj , j = 1, . . . , z} (19)
Let e be number of happened error links, then we consider:
Case-1-1: e = 1 in first attack.
There are two choices for adversary to conduct the corrup-
tion,
1.1) Attack one of xi, i = 1, . . . , k1,
1.2) Attack one of rj , j = 1, . . . , z.
For (1.1), node A observes all δj 6= 0 ∈ ∆ and not hard to
see that it can identify the attacked link.
For (1.2), node A observes single δi 6= 0 of ∆, and the
other δj in ∆ equals to zero.
Both of these observation happened in first time, node A
sends CS signal to node B, which triggers node B sending
W to sink.
Case-1-2: e ≥ 2 in subsequent attack.
We show node A can detect if there is new error link
happened by observe ∆ or a variation of ∆. In subsequent
attack, in order to avoid detecting by node A, adversary should
create the same observation of ∆ for node A by attacking new
links.
For (1.1) happened in first attack, we give,
Claim 1. Given single xˆi, i ∈ [1, k1] is attacked in first attack,
adversary cannot hide new error link in next attack.
Proof: Assume adversary attacks new links in X in next
attack, node A observes the following equations
δj − ηi,j
ηi,1
δ1
=
k1∑
g=1
ηg,j4xg +4rj − ηi,j
ηi,1
(
k1∑
g=1
ηg,14xg +4r1)
=
k1\i∑
g=1
(ηg,j − ηi,j
ηi,1
ηg,1)4xg +4rj − ηi,j
ηi,1
4r1 (20)
j = 2, . . . , z
In (20), the term 4xi is canceled (4xi is on the previous
identified link). Except 4xi, there are at most z− 1 non-zero
injected error terms including 4xj ,4rj . Note that we have
z − 1 equations, by property of linear there must be at least
one non-zero equation if new error link happened.
For (1.2) happened in first time, node A observed one δj 6=
0 and all the other δi = 0 in ∆. In subsequent attack, adversary
has z−1 extra ability to corrupt new links, adversary has two
possible attack behavior:
1) Only attack new single link, i.e., attack either one of x
or rl, l ∈ [1, z] such that δl 6= 0, l 6= j.
2) Attack multi links.
Consider only new single error link happened. If it’s happened
on one of xi, i = 1, .., k1, it will cause all δi 6= 0 in ∆,
which will let node A know there’s new error link happened.
If adversary only attacks one of rl, l 6= j, node A will observe
δl 6= 0 and the other δj = 0 in ∆, which can trigger node A
sending CS.
Consider multi error links in next attack. If error only
injected in r, then node A will observe more than one non-zero
δj of ∆; if there is error on x, assuming z˜ errors happened
on xi, i = 1, .., k1, in order to keep (z − 1) δi = 0, i 6= j,
adversary needs to attack z extra links since the property
of MDS code, however adversary only has z − 1 − z˜ extra
ability, it indicates that if any new error link happened, node
A will observe more than one δj 6= 0 in ∆. And it means that
adversary cannot hide multi-error in next attack, i.e., adversary
cannot attack multi links such that only δj 6= 0 and all the other
δi = 0 in ∆.
Case-2: 2 ≤ |∆| < z, 0 < k′2 ≤ z − 2
By condition, the row has structure
(x1, . . . , xk1 , v1, . . . , vk′2 , r1, . . . , rk3) (21)
where 2 ≤ k3 ≤ z. Given a received (21), we have
∆ = {δj = rˆj −
k1∑
i=1
ηi,j xˆi −
k1+k
′
2∑
i=k1+1
ηi,j vˆi|j = 1, . . . , k3}
where for j = 1, . . . , k3,
δj = rj +4rj − (
k1∑
i=1
ηi,j xˆi +
k1+k
′
2∑
i=k1+1
ηi,j vˆi)
=
k1+k
′
2∑
i=1
ηi,j4xi +4rj
where 4xi = xi− xˆi and 4xi,4ri are injected error symbol.
First we show node adversary cannot hide erroneous on both
of node A and B at the same time, which implies that once
error happened first time either node A or node B can detect
it.
Assume upstream link/links was/were attacked, the only
way to avoid detection on node A is given observation of
all δj = 0 ∈ ∆, which is
k1+k
′
2∑
i=1
ηi,j4xi +4rj = 0, j = 1, . . . , k3
Without error detection, node A sends set F to node B, where
F = {fj = vˆj +
k1∑
i=1
θi,j xˆi|j = 1, . . . , k′2} (22)
where θi,j ∈ H and H is k1×k′2 matrix, each entry of which
is chosen uniformly at random from nonzero entries of a large
finite field such that columns have maximal independence.
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When node B receives set F , recall that it knows all sending
message by source, it observes for fj ∈ F, j = 1, . . . , k′2.
ωj = fj − vj −
k1∑
i=1
θi,jxi (23)
= (vˆj − vj) +
k1∑
i=1
θi,j(xˆi − xi)
= 4vj +
k1∑
i=1
θi,j4xi
since 4vj ,4xj ,4rj are injected error symbols, and adver-
sary only can affect z links at most. Also we have k3+k′2 = z,
therefor there must be at least one ωi 6= 0, otherwise it implies
all injected 4vj ,4xj ,4rj equal to zero, which contradicts
assumption.
So once upstream links are attacked first time, either node
A or node B can detect it, and if there are more than one
upstream links attacked, by Lemma 1, it won’t need detection
of intermediate nodes in subsequent transmissions. Then we
consider the attacking scenario as
Case-2-1: e = 1 in first attack.
Consider a received vector as (21) with a single corrupted
symbol, the possible position is
2.1) xˆj , j ∈ [1, k1] is attacked or
2.2) vˆj , j ∈ [1, k′2] is attacked or
2.3) rˆj , j ∈ [1, k3] is attacked.
For single error on either (2.1) or (2.2), it’s not hard to
check that node A observes all δj 6= 0 ∈ ∆. Node A can
observe received vector,
(xˆ1, . . . , xˆk1 , vˆ1, . . . , vˆk′2 , rˆ1, . . . , rˆk3)
since k3 ≥ 2 and rˆj is redundancy of xˆj , vˆj , it’s not hard
to see that node A can identify single error symbol by MDS
property.
For single error on (2.3), node A observes single δj 6= 0 of
∆ and the other δj′ = 0, under which node A believes that rˆj
was corrupted.
Once node A identifies error link, it sends CS to node B
to trigger node B sending W to sink.
Case-2-2: e ≥ 2 in subsequent attack.
For the case that (2.1) or (2.2) happened in first time,
assume xˆl or vˆl was attacked in previous transmission. Given
a received vector (21), node A observes
δj − ηl,jη−1l,k3δk3
= (
k1+k
′
2∑
i=1
ηi,j4xi +4rj)− ηl,jη−1l,k3(
k1+k
′
2∑
i=1
ηi,k34xi +4rk3)
=
k1+k
′
2\l∑
i=1
(ηi,j − ηl,jη−1l,k3ηi,k3)4xi +4rj − ηl,jη−1l,k34rk3(24)
where δj , δk3 ∈ ∆, j = 1, . . . , k3−1. Since (24) has removed
possible non-zero 4xl detected in first attack, if there is any
non-zero (24), j = 1, . . . , k3−1, there must be new error link
happened, node A sends CS signal to node B, otherwise node
A observes all zero of (24), recall that node A has already
identified xˆl or vˆl in previous, it sends set F to node B, each
of fj defined as
fj =

vˆj +
k1∑
i=1
θi,j xˆi and
k1∑
i=1
θi,lxˆi j 6= l, if vˆl happened
vˆj +
k1\l∑
i=1
θi,j xˆi if xˆl happened
And similarly as (23) node B observes
ωj =

4vj +
k1∑
i=1
θi,j4xi and
k1∑
i=1
θi,l4xi j 6= l, if vˆl happened
4vj +
k1\l∑
i=1
4xi if xˆl happened
for fj ∈ F, j = 1, . . . , k′2.
Notice that both of (24) and ωj has canceled item 4xl or
4vl, together with observation on node A, there are z − 1
equations for z− 1 at most new injected error symbols. Since
k′2 + k3 − 1 = z − 1 and adversary can inject z − 1 at most
error symbols besides xˆl or vˆl, if new error position happened,
there must be nonzero ωj , otherwise it gives contradiction to
linear property.
For the case (2.3) happened first time, assume rˆl was
attacked in first time. Given a received vector (21), node A
observes corresponding ∆ first.
Recall definition of ∆, if there is δj 6= 0, j 6= l, it indicates
nonzero 4xi,4rj , j 6= l and must be new error position
happened, node A sends CS signal to node B. If node A
has observation δj = 0, j = 1, . . . , k3, j 6= l, which is
k1+k
′
2∑
i=1
ηi,j4xi,j +4rj = 0, j 6= l
it sends set F (22) to node B and node B follows process (23)
to observe
ωj = 4vj +
k1∑
i=1
θi,j4xi, j = 1, . . . , k′2
If there is new error position happened, there must be nonzero
ωj which triggers node B sending claim W to sink, otherwise
all ωj = 0 indicate no new error position happened.
Case-3: |∆| = 0, k′2 = z
By the condition, since k1 + k′2 = n the row has structure
(x1, . . . , xk1 , v1, . . . , xk′2) = (x1, . . . , xk1 , xk1+1, . . . , xn) (25)
where xi ∈ X . Let G be generator matrix for (n + z, n)
systematic MDS code, and
G = (In×n E)
where In×n is unit matrix and E is a n× z matrix, entry of
which is denoted by ηi,j , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ z, which are
chosen uniformly at random from nonzero entries of a large
finite field.
7
For a received (25), node A operates as
(xˆ1, . . . , xˆk1 , xˆk1+1, . . . , xˆk1+k′2)E
and send the following set to node B,
F = {fj =
n∑
i=1
ηi,j xˆi|j = 1, . . . , z} (26)
Node B receives set F , since node B has knowledge about
true message symbols, it can operate as
Ω = {ωj = fj −
n∑
i=1
ηi,jxi,j |fj ∈ F, j = 1, . . . , z}
not hard to see that ωj =
∑n
i ηi,j4xi.
Case-3-1: e = 1 in first attack.
Node B observes all ωi,j 6= 0 in first time, it knows error
happened, node B observes
ωj
ω1
=
∑n
i=1 ηi,j4xi∑n
i=1 ηi,14xi
, j = 2, . . . , z
Assume xˆl was attacked, node B will has observation as
ηl,j
ηl,1
, j = 2, . . . , z, thus node B trust that xˆl was attacked and
sends claim W to sink.
Case-3-2: e ≥ 2 in subsequent attack.
For this case by applying the proof of Claim 1, it will show
adversary cannot hide new error link by attacking multiple
links. Thus once there is new error link happened, it triggers
node B sending W to sink.
Case-4: |∆| = 1, k′2 = z − 1.
By the condition, the row has structure as
(x1, . . . , xk1 , v1, . . . , vk′2 , r1) (27)
Given a received vector (27), we have
∆ = δ1 =
k1+k
′
2∑
i=1
ηi,14xi +4r1
The first time node A observes δ1 6= 0, it implies that there
must be nonzero 4xi,4r1, and node A can send CS signal
to node B. However single redundant symbol r1 cannot help
node A identifying erroneous position, it says no matter either
δ1 = 0 or δ1 6= 0 observed in subsequent transmission, node
A cannot find out if new error position happened. We need to
consider another scheme.
If certain row has property of k′2 = z − 1, it indicates that
d ba−ce ≥ z − 1. And since b < z(a − c) by tight condition,
we focus on z − 2 < ba−c < z.
The intuition of this case is that we first show for most of
b ∈ ((z − 2)(a− c), z(a− c)), we could arrange k′2 for each
row of X properly such that situation of X falls into cases
we have solved. Then we discuss the detection and decoding
scheme on more specific condition of b.
First we consider network under two conditions: either b <
z(a− c)− 1, z > 2 or b is even subjected by b < z(a− c)−
1, z = 2. It’s not hard to check that we could modify encoding
scheme slightly such that following properties holds for each
row of X:
• either k′2 = z for some row of X , i.e., |∆| = 0
• or 0 ≤ k′2 ≤ z− 2 for some row of X , i.e., 2 ≤ |∆| ≤ z.
Proof: We first consider the network with b < z(a− c)−
1, z > 2. For b = z(a − c) − φ, 2 ≤ φ ≤ z, we could assign
k′2 = z such that each row of first (a − c − 1) rows of X
carries z vi symbols giving |∆| = 0 and the last row of X
carry (z−φ) vi symbols. Notice that we have 0 ≤ z−φ ≤ z−2
giving 2 ≤ |∆| ≤ z.
For b = z(a− c− t)−φ, 1 ≤ t < a− c, 1 ≤ φ ≤ z− 1, we
could arrange k′2 such that:
• Each row of first (a− c− t− 1) rows of X carries z vi
symbols,
• The (a−c−t)th row of X carries (z−φ−1) vi symbols,
• The (a− c− t+ 1)th row carries 1 vi symbols,
• On the remaining row of X , no vi is carried.
which gives that |∆| = 0 for first (a− c− t− 1) rows of X ,
2 ≤ |∆| ≤ z on (a− c− t)th row of X , |∆| = z − 1 ≥ 2 on
(a− c− t+ 1)th row of X and |∆| = z > 2 on the remaining
row of X .
And for the network with b is even under b < z(a − c) −
1, z = 2, the result is trivial.
Detection ability of rows having |∆| = 0 and 2 ≤ |∆| ≤
z have been discussed corresponding to Case-1 and Case-2
respectively and the detection ability of rows having structure
|∆| = z will be discussed in Case-4. Therefore we could
assume intermediate nodes have a detectable structure of X
under condition either b < z(a − c) − 1, z > 2 or b is even
subjected by b < z(a− c)− 1, z = 2.
Next we consider network under conditions: either b =
z(a−c)−1, z > 2 or b is odd subjected by b < z(a−c)−1, z =
2, it’s not hard to check that
4.1- For b = z(a − c) − 1, z > 2, we can arrange each row
of k′2 such that |∆| = z for each row of first (a− c−1)
rows of X and |∆| = 1 for the last row of X;
4.2- b < z(a − c) − 1, z = 2 and b is odd. we could let X
has structure as
4.2.1 either |∆| = 2 or |∆| = 0 on the first (a− c− 1)th
row of X and
4.2.2 |∆| = 1 on the last row of X .
Theorem 2. Given b = z(a − c) − 1, z > 2 or b is odd
subjected by b < z(a − c) − 1, z = 2, there is a solution for
sink to decode correctly without claim from node B after sink
identified single error on upstream link.
Proof: Given adversary only corrupts single link on up-
stream in first attack and attacks new error links in subsequent
transmission. Assume that ith upstream link was identified in
previous transmission, denote the remaining network by G\i.
Feedback Condition-1: b = z(a− c)− 1, z > 2.
Recall (4.1), we first consider rows of received Xˆ having
|∆| = z on upstream, which is discussed in Case-1, it says
that in subsequent transmission if new error link happened,
intermediate nodes will find it out. If no claim is sent by node
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B, it indicates that the remaining of these rows are clean. And
there are totally (a− c− 1) rows having |∆| = z property.
For the case that there is no new error link happened on
these rows, since it’s encoded n independent message symbols
in each row and sink has already identified one single error
link, there is independent symbols as many as,
R1 = (n− 1)(a− c− 1)
Note that without a little rigorous, we will use R1 to represent
these independent symbols on (a − c − 1) rows of X in
following.
Then we consider the (a − c)th row of received Xˆ with
|∆| = 1. Node A sends received vˆi, i = 1, .., z − 1 to node B
in next transmission. Since node B knows all true vi symbols,
if there is any symbol corrupted, it must be detected and claim
will be sent which will let sink has an MDS code, otherwise
it does nothing.
With nothing of information from node B, it indicates that
all these received symbols vˆi, i = 1, .., z − 1 are reliable.
Recall that in the absence of claim from node B, sink can
trust first (a−c−1) rows of upstream on the remaining network
G\i. Denote the remaining network G\i excluding first (a −
c− 1) rows of upstream by G′.
We show that there exists a collection of link subset on G′,
which has at least UB − R1 − (z − 1) symbols independent
with R1, vi.
Let link subset on G′ be formulated as: remove links
carrying symbols vˆi, i = 1, .., z− 1 first, the number of which
is z−1 and remove another (z−1) links as following priority
order: first removing upstream links, and then downstream link
until (z − 1) links have been removed altogether.
Not hard to see symbols in the link subset we defined
is independent with R1, vi. Then we observe the number
of symbols in this link subset. We organize discussion by
topology of network:
Category-1: n > 2(z − 1)
By above description, the number of independent symbol
on the link subset of G′ is
R2 = (n− 1− 2(z − 1))(c+ 1) +mc (28)
Then we see,
R1 +R2 + (z − 1)
= (n− z)a+ (m− z)c+ (z − 1)a− (z − 2)c− z
= UB − b+ (z − 1)a− (z − 2)c− z
≥ UB + 2c− a− z + 2 (29)
where (29) follows that b ≤ z(a− c)− 1 and (z − 1) is from
the number of vˆi, i = 1, ..., z − 1.
Since b < min{z(a− c), zc− (z − 2)a} by tight condition
(1), we focus on the condition z(a − c) ≤ zc − (z − 2)a,
otherwise we cannot have b = z(a− c)− 1. Then we have
c
a
≥ z − 1
z
(30)
a
a− c ≥ z
Note that we don’t have to consider tight condition (3) since
(m− z)(a− c) < z(a− c) for m < 2z, no matter how there
is always b < z(a− c)− 1.
Then we observe,
2c− a− z + 2 ≥ 2c− a− a
a− c + 2 (31)
where (31) follows (30), let a− c = x, we have
2c− a+ 2− a
x
=
−2x2 + (a+ 2)x− a
x
not hard to see that the root of −2x2 + (a + 2)x − a are
x1 = 1, x2 =
a
2 , which says that as long as 1 ≤ x ≤ a2 , the
result of −2x2 + (a+ 2)x− a are no less than zero.
Since x = a − c, recall (30) and z ≥ 2, not hard to check
that we have 1 ≤ x ≤ a2 , which shows that
2c− a+ 2− a
x
=
−2x2 + (a+ 2)x− a
x
≥ 0
Then we have
R1 +R2 + (z − 1) ≥ UB (32)
Category-2: z < n ≤ 2(z − 1)
Similarly, on the link subset of G′, the independent symbol
is
R2 = (m− (2(z − 1)− (n− 1)))c
= (n+m− 2z + 1)c
then the total reliable symbols we have
R1 +R2 + (z − 1)
= (n+m− 2z + 1)c+ (n− 1)(a− c− 1) + (z − 1)
= UB − b+ (z − 1)a− (z − 2)c− (n− z)
≥ UB + 2c− a− (n− z) + 1 (33)
= UB + 2c− a− n+ z + 1 (34)
where (33) follows that b ≤ z(a− c)− 1.
And since tight condition (2), i.e., b < min{z(a− c), (n−
z + 2)c − (n − z)a}, we consider the case z(a − c) ≤ (n −
z + 2)c− (n− z)a, which gives
c
a− c ≥
n
2
2a
a− c − 2 ≥ n (35)
also we have z(a − c) ≤ zc − (n − z)a since n ≤ 2(z − 1),
which gives z ≥ na2c . Similarly, we ignore tight condition (4).
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Then we observe,
2c− a− n+ z + 1
≥ 2c− a− n+ na
2c
+ 1
= 2c− a− (1− a
2c
)n+ 1
≥ 2c− a− 2c− a
2c
(
2a
a− c − 2) + 1
= 2c− a− 2c− a
2c
2c
a− c + 1
= 2c− a− a
a− c +
2(a− c)
a− c + 1
= 2c− a− a
a− c + 3
In category-1, we have shown that 2c−a− aa−c + 2 ≥ 0, thus
in category-2, we have
R1 +R2 + (z − 1) > UB (36)
Notice that above proof all shows that network we need to
consider is subjected by m ≥ 2z.
Feedback Condition-2: b is odd subjected by b < z(a −
c)− 1, z = 2.
Recall (4.2), similarly we first consider rows having either
|∆| = z or |∆| = 0 of received Xˆ . By Case-1 and Case-
3, we know intermediate nodes can detect new error position
after first attack. Also there (a− c− 1) rows satisfying these
condition.
Then we observe the independent symbols for the case that
no new error link happened after first attack. Since there are
b b2c rows having |∆| = z and there are b − 1 vi symbols on
first (a− c− 1)th rows, so we should have
R1 = (n− 2)(a− c− 1) + (b− 1)− b b
2
c
where b b2c is number of symbols lost on identified single link.
Following the same logic in Feedback Condition-1,
Category-1: n > 2(z − 1), we have
R2 = (n− 1− 2(z− 1))(c+ 1) +mc = (n− 3)(c+ 1) +mc
Then we see
R1 +R2 + 1 = UB + c− b b
2
c − 1
> UB + c− 1− b2(a− c)− 1
2
c
> UB + c− 1− (a− c− 1)
= UB + 2c− a
recall (30), we have ca ≥ 12 , which indicates that
R1 +R2 + 1 ≥ UB (37)
Category-2: z < n ≤ 2(z − 1). Obviously, there is no such
network.
Next we show by the result (32), (36), (37), we can design
a decoder for sink. Specifically, let set S be all forward link
on G′. Define two subsets of S as,
S1 = { links which carry symbols vi on G′}
S2 = S\{i, S1}
where i is the index of link identified in previous transmission.
The intuition of decoder is to directly consider different sets
of z − 1 links as removing set and check the remaining links
for consistency. When it finds a consistent set, the decoding
process ends. Thus we consider all possible sets of 2(z −
1) links and show that the remaining links carry a full rank
complete decoding set.
The remaining symbols must contain a full rank non-
erroneous set from which all the message symbols can be
correctly decoded, along with others that may or may not be
erroneous. Therefore if the considered subset (removing set)
includes all the actual erroneous links, the remaining symbols
will be consistent and give the correct decoding, whereas if the
remaining symbols contain errors there will be inconsistency
with the full rank non-erroneous set.
The decoder exhaustively goes through all sets of (z − 1)
forward links in turn, checking if the remaining forward links
are consistent. If they are consistent, they give the correct
message. Let new error link set be E = E1 ∪E2 in G′, where
E1 ⊆ S1, E2 ⊂ S2 and |E1|+ |E2| ≤ z − 1.
For the case that E = E1 ⊆ S1, i.e., all new (z − 1) at
most error happened in S1, note that since vˆi can be detected
on node B, we consider the new errors that occurred on Y
of S1 for this case. If we consider the remaining link subset
by (32), (36), (37), it indicates that under E = E1 it will
give more than one full rank non-erroneous link subset since
|S2| > z − 1.
Starting from this case, we show decoder can finish decod-
ing process as following order:
O-1 Assume E = E1 ⊆ S1, i.e., all new errors happened
in S1, observing whether there is consistent result by
removing {S1, S˜}, where S˜ ⊂ S2 is followed by priority
order. If it successes, output the result, otherwise goes
to next,
O-2 Assume both of E1 and E2 are non-empty, then make
consistent check in remaining link subset. If it successes,
output the result, otherwise goes to next,
O-3 Above two processes failed, it indicates that E = E2 ⊂
S2, decoder decode in remaining links.
O-1: New errors set E only happened in S1, i.e., E = E1 ⊆
S1.
Decoder first removes links in Sr = {S1, S˜}, where S˜ ⊂ S2
and |S˜| = z − 1. Since |S2| > z − 1, we can have more
than one subset S˜. Recall (32), (36), (37), the remaining link
subset together with R1, vi will provide no less than UB non-
erroneous symbols. And clearly this kind of link subset is more
than one.
Clearly for E ⊆ S1, correct decoding occurs since all
possible remaining link subsets together with R1, vi will give
consistent result. However, if E 6⊆ S1, it indicates that by
changing S˜, there must be an inconsistent result, then decoder
goes to next.
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O-2: New errors happened in both of S1 and S2, i.e., |E1| 6=
0, |E2| 6= 0, 0 < |E1| + |E2| ≤ z − 1. We assume |E1| 6= 0,
it implies that z > 2, otherwise |E2| = 0 for z = 2 since one
error link has been identified.
O-1 decoded unsuccessfuly, it implies that S1 doesn’t in-
clude all new error links, i.e., |E2| 6= 0.
Consider removing set Sr = {S1, S˜}, S1 includes E1
erroneous subset, if E2 ⊂ S˜, similarly, by (32), (36), (37),
the sum of R1, S\Sr and vˆi, is no less than UB, and we
show one consistent result at least will be given.
Let S˜ = {E2, S3}, where S3 ⊂ S2\E2, |S3|+ |E2| = z−1.
Since |E2| < z − 1, it implies that |S3| ≥ 1. Note that if we
hold E2 unchanged and change set S3, we could have a group
of S˜ which have different subset S3.
Recall that E is new error link set, let 4E is injected error
vector set corresponding to E, the element of which is injected
error vector denoted by 4ei on ei ∈ E.
For an set Sr, suppose S\Sr includes error link, it’s not
hard to see that the result from (S\Sr, R1, vi) will pollute the
original clean message symbol, we claim:
Claim 2. The polluted message symbol resulted from
(S\Sr, R1, vi) equals to the clean symbol injected by a linear
combination of erroneous in 4E.
Proof: Consider we compute message symbols from
(S\Sr, R1, vi). Suppose S\Sr includes erroneous, let cˆ =
c+4e be polluted symbols in S\Sr, where c is clean symbol
and 4e is injected error.
According to encoding scheme, each symbol in
(S\Sr, R1, vi) can be written,
cˆ = H(x,y)
= c+4e
where x,y represent for message symbols x ∈ X , y ∈ Y,
respectively and H(·) is a linear function determined by
encoding scheme.
Since |x|+ |y| = UB and |(S\Sr, R1, vi)| ≥ UB, we have
enough independent linear function H(x,y) to compute x,y.
And by the property of linear, it’s not hard to see that the
result of xˆ, yˆ equals to
xˆ = x+H1(E)
yˆ = y +H2(E)
where Hi(E) is a linear function for injected error set deter-
mined by encoding scheme.
Then we see the following claim.
Claim 3. There exists inconsistent output for two removing
sets S˜1 = {E′2, S13}, S˜2 = {E′2, S23} where E′2 is subset of E2,
|E′2| < |E2|, and Si3 is error free subset of S2, |E′2|+ |Si3| =
z − 1, i = 1, 2.
Proof: We consider the case that |E1| = 1, |E2| = z − 2
and |E′2| = 0, which says the removing subset S˜i, i = 1, 2
doesn’t includes any error link, i.e., E2 ∈ S2\S˜i, giving S˜1 =
S13 , S˜
2 = S23 . This is obviously the worst case since S2\S˜i
includes all z − 2 error links.
Let S13 = {S′, i}, S23 = {S′, j}, where i, j, i 6= j are index
of forward link and i, j 6∈ S′, |S′| = z − 2. Then we use
S13(i), S
2
3(j) to represent for S˜
1, S˜2 respectively.
Assume S\{S1, S13(i)}, S\{S1, S23(j)} give consistent re-
sult together with R1, vi respectively. Note that according
to result from (S\Sr, R1, vi), where Sr ∈ {{S1, S13(i)}, {S1,
S23(j)}} , sink can compute the symbols which are in the re-
moving set S13(i), S
2
3(j). Then since the consistency occurred,
we should have following properties between S13(i) and S
2
3(j):
Symbols on jth link computed from the result of
(S\{S1, S13(i)}, R1, vi) are consistent with symbols on jth in
S23(j).
Define cj,i is a symbol on jth link computed from the result
of (S\{S1, S13(i)}, R1, vi) and ci,j is a symbol on ith link
computed from the result of (S\{S1, S23(j)}, R1, vi). Similar,
we use ci,i as a symbol on ith link in S13(i) and cj,j as a
symbol on jth link in S23(j). Since S
1
3(i) and S
2
3(j) are error
free link set by definition, ci,i and cj,j are true symbols, by
above, we have,
cj,i = cj,j +Hi(e)
= cj,j
where Hi(·) is linear function of injected error determined
by coding scheme, which e is linear combination of error
vector injected in z − 2 links by Claim 2 and belongs to
S\{S1, S˜i}, i = 1, 2. Since consistency occurred, we have
cj,i = cj,j , which implies that Hi(e) = 0.
Suppose that i and j in S13(i), S
2
3(j) respectively are the
index of downstream links, it implies that there are c equations
having Hj(e) = 0, j = 1, ..., c.
Then decoder changes j in S23(j) to k, where k 6= j 6=
i, k 6∈ S′ and let k be index of downstream. Repeat above ob-
servation, since consistency happened, it gives another group
of linear functions Hk(e) = 0, k = 1, .., c. And note that
m ≥ 2z for z > 2, thus we have at least (m − 1)c linear
function Hi(e) = 0.
Recall that we have (z − 2)a injected error at most in
E2, by (30), (35), it’s not hard to see that 2c ≥ a, which
gives (m − 1)c ≥ (z − 2)a, and totally we have Hi(e) =
0, i = 1, .., (m− 1)c , which indicates that e equals to zero, it
obviously contradicts to our assumption that we should have
non-zero injected error vector e.
Claim 3 indicates a decoding strategy: there is only one
removing set Sr = {S1, S˜}, where S˜ = {E2, S3}, |E2| <
z − 1, |S3| > 0, |E2|+ |S3| = z − 1, S3 ∈ S2 such that when
holding E2 unchanged, sink changes S3, the (S\Sr, R1, vi)
give the consistent output.
If sink cannot find E2 satisfying above requirement, it says
assumption 3 happened and goes to next case.
Case-3: New error only happened in S2 and E = E2 ⊂ S2,
i.e., |E1| = 0, |E2| = z − 1.
In this case the symbols in S1 are clean. Still we consider
removing set Sr = {S1, S˜} first. Sink can have a result from
(R1, S\Sr, vi).
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Since S1 is clean under this case, sink could trust symbols
in it. Then sink computes vi by the result from (S\Sr, R1, vi).
If the result is inconsistent with corresponding symbols in
S1, sink choose different Sr to repeat above procedure till
consistency occurs. We show that sink can trust this result.
By occurred consistency, it gives,
vi = Hi(vˆi)
= Hi(vi) +Hi(4vi)
where vi ∈ S1 and vˆi are symbols computed from the result of
(S\Sr, R1, vi), 4vi are linear combination of injected error
vector by Claim 2 and Hi(·) is a linear function determined
by encoding scheme.
Since consistency, Hi(4vi) = 0. Similarly, we will have,
yj = Hj(yˆ)
= Hj(y) +Hj(4y)
where yj ∈ S1 and yˆ are symbols computed from the result
of (S\Sr, R1, vi), yˆ = y+4y, y represent true symbols, 4y
are linear combination of injected error vector by Claim 2 and
Hj(·) is a linear function determined by encoding scheme.
Then we have Hj(4y) = 0.
Note that each 4vi,4y is linear combination of injected
error vector and we have (z − 1) links at most corrupted ,
since |S1| = z − 1, with all Hj(4y) = 0, Hi(4vi) = 0, it
indicates that these all injected error equals to zero. Thus sink
can trust the result from (S\Sr, R1, vi).
C. Summary of Error Signaling Procedure
For received Xˆ , we define ∆1, l = 1, . . . , a − c for each
row of Xˆ as definition (16). We summarize the error signaling
procedure on intermediate node A and B for as follows:
1) For |∆l| = z, node A observes nonzero δj ∈ ∆l first
time, it sends CS single to node B and node B sends
W to sink. And Claim 1 shows adversary cannot hide
new error position for node A in subsequent attack.
2) For 2 ≤ |∆l| < z, if node A observes nonzero δj∆l first
time it sends CS to node B; for observation all δj = 0,
it sends set (22) to node B, either of which will help
intermediate nodes identifying happened error.
In subsequent transmission, node A and B cooperate
following Case 2-2.
3) For |∆l| = 0, each time node A sends set (26) to node
B, according which node B can identifying new error
position once it happened.
4) For |∆l| = 1, intermediates nodes cooperates directly as
Case 4 described.
Notice that for all rows of X , if no new error position is
detected, amount of transmission on feedback equals to b.
D. Summary
By above analysis, when node A sends CS signal or node
B sends claim to sink, it causes overhead problem on feedback
and downstream, however this overhead only happens when
there is new error link occured, and by Lemma 1 after identi-
fying two error links, sink doesn’t need any side information
from feedback or claim. Once either node A sends two times
CS signal or node B sends claim two times, it doesn’t need
any side information in future transmission, which means that
comparing to the whole transmission, these overhead can be
ignored.
VII. DECODING
At steps in which error signaling occurs, all information is
forwarded to the sink, enabling it to identify the erroneous
links and decode correctly as described in the previous sub-
section. In this section we show that the sink is also able to
decode correctly at steps in which no error signaling occurs.
Let e be the number of previously identified erroneous links.
The sink considers the network excluding these e links, which
can contain at most z − e erroneous links.
The sink considers each subset of z − e links in turn,
assuming it to be the erroneous set and checking whether this
assumption is consistent with its observations, i.e. whether the
symbols that are assumed to be non-erroneous have consistent
values. We will show that if the remaining symbols are consis-
tent, then they give the correct decoding. The argument shows
that the equations corresponding to the remaining symbols
must contain a full rank non-erroneous set from which all the
message symbols can be correctly decoded, along with others
that may or may not be erroneous. Therefore if the considered
subset includes all the actual erroneous links, the remaining
symbols will be consistent and give the correct decoding,
whereas if the remaining symbols contain errors there will
be inconsistency with the full rank non-erroneous set. The
arguments relies on the property that except for redundant
symbols on the upstream links, the remaining code symbols
received by the sink form an MDS code.
For the case z = 1, if an error has previously been signaled,
the single erroneous link has been identified. If no errors
have been signaled, this means that there are no errors in X .
Therefore, message symbols X ,F are decoded correctly from
X , and the MDS property of the generic linear code ensures
correct decoding of message symbols Y under errors in Y on
any single link.
We discuss the case z ≥ 2 as following structure:
Case 1: e ≥ 2.
In this case, by Lemma 1 the feedback link is no longer
needed. We show that removing any 2(z−e) links in addition
to the e identified erroneous links still leaves a full rank
non-erroneous set along with at least one additional symbol.
To find the worst-case number of remaining non-erroneous
MDS symbols at the sink, we remove 2z − e links from the
original network in the following priority order: first removing
upstream links, and then downstream links, until 2z − e links
have been removed altogether, with e set to its minimum value,
2. Note that 2z − 2 ≥ z since z ≥ 2.
Case 1-1: 2z−2 ≤ n. The worst-case number of remaining
non-erroneous MDS symbols is K1 = (a− c)(n+ 2− 2z) +
c(n+m+ 2−2z)) = a(n+ 2−2z) + cm. For category 1 and
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3 networks, applying the inequality b ≤ zc − (z − 2)a from
(1) and (3), we have
K1 − UB = (n+ 2− 2z)a+mc
−((n− z)a+ (m− z)c+ b)
= 2a− z(a− c)− b
≥ 0.
Thus, the condition for correct decoding is satisfied. For
category 2 and 4 networks, applying the inequality b ≤
(n− z + 2)c− (n− z)a from (2) and (4), we have
K1 − UB = 2a− z(a− c)− b
≥ a(2− 2z + n)
≥ 0
where the last inequality follows from the assumption 2z−2 ≤
n. This also satisfies the condition for correct decoding.
Case 2a-2: 2z − 2 > n. In this case, the network falls in
category 2 or 4, and the worst-case number of remaining non-
erroneous MDS symbols is K2 = c(m+n−2z+2). Applying
the inequality b ≤ (n− z + 2)c− (n− z)a from (2) and (4),
we have
K2 − UB = 2c− (n− z)(a− c)
−(n− z + 2)c− (n− z)a
≥ 0.
Thus, the condition for correct decoding is satisfied.
Case 2: e < 2 links not including the feedback link have
previously been identified as erroneous. By the arguments in
the previous subsection, if no error is being signaled, there
are two possibilities: either there are no errors in X on the
remaining links, or the feedback link is erroneous.
Case 2-1: The feedback link is erroneous. For any size-
(z− e) subset considered by the sink, at most z− e− 1 other
forward links in the remaining network are erroneous.
If the size-(z − e) subset considered by the sink contains
the feedback link, the worst-case number of remaining non-
erroneous MDS symbols is obtained by removing 2z − e− 2
forward links from the original network in the same priority
order as in Case 1, with e = 0. This is equal to SB2, which is
greater than or equal to UB by the conditions (1-4), so correct
decoding occurs.
If the size-(z − e) subset considered by the sink does not
contain the feedback link, the corresponding assumption is that
all the symbols in X other than those on the e identified erro-
neous links are correct. The worst-case number of remaining
non-erroneous MDS symbols is obtained by removing z − 1
forward links from the original network in the same priority
order as in Case 1, along with the symbols in Y from z − e
other links, with e = 0, This gives a(n − z) + c(m − z) + a
remaining non-erroneous MDS symbols, which is greater than
UB, so correct decoding occurs.
Case 2-2: The feedback link is not erroneous. In this case,
there are no errors in X on the remaining links.
If the size-(z − e) subset considered by the sink contains
the feedback link, the worst-case number of remaining non-
erroneous MDS symbols is obtained by removing z−1 forward
links from the original network in the same priority order as
in Case 1, along with the symbols in Y from z−e other links,
with e = 0. This gives a(n− z) + c(m− z+ 1) +k remaining
non-erroneous MDS symbols, which is greater than UB, so
correct decoding occurs.
If the size-(z − e) subset considered by the sink does
not contain the feedback link, the corresponding assumption
is that all the symbols in X other than those on the e
identified erroneous links are correct. The worst-case number
of remaining non-erroneous MDS symbols is obtained by
removing the symbols in V from 2z − e links, with u = 0,
and noting that z(a− c)− b of the remaining symbols are not
MDS. This gives a(n − z) + c(m − z) + b remaining non-
erroneous MDS symbols, which is equal to UB, so correct
decoding occurs.
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